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Abstract 
Conso l ida t ion  i s  o f ten  cons idered  as  a  means  to  lower  se rv ice  de l ivery  cos ts  
and  enhance  accountab i l i t y .  Th is  paper  uses  a  prospect ive  eva lua t ion  des ign  
to  der ive  es t imates  of  the  potent ia l  cos t  sav ings  tha t  may  a r i se  f rom Loca l  
Hea l thcare  Author i t i e s  (LHAs)  ama lgamat ion  process ,  wh ich  i s  concern ing  
the  I ta l i an  Nat iona l  Hea l th  Sys tem.  We focus  spec i f i ca l l y  on  cos t  sav ings  
due  to  sca le  economies  w i th  re fe rence  to  a  par t i cu la r  subse t  o f  the  
product ion  cos ts  o f  the  LHAs,  i . e .  the  admin is t ra t ive  cos ts  toge ther  w i th  
the  purchas ing  cos ts  o f  both  goods  as  we l l  a s  non-hea l thcare  re la ted  
se rv ices .  Our  resu l t s  demonst ra te  the  ex i s tence  of  economies  of  sca le  
l inked  to  the  s ize  of  the  LHA popu la t ion .  Hence ,  the  dec i s ion  to  reduce  the  
number  of  LHAs may  resu l t  in  l a rger  loca l  hea l th  au thor i t i e s  tha t  a re  more  
cos t  e f f i c ien t ,  e spec ia l l y  when the  conso l ida t ion  process  concerns  merg ing  
a  l a rge  number  of  LHA.  
 
 
 
Keywords  
Italian Health Care System, Local Health Authority, Consolidation 
 
JEL Codes 
H59,  I18 
 
 
 
 Address for correspondence: 
Cinzia Di Novi 
Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe 
30121 Venezia - Italy 
Phone: (++39) 041 2349155 
Fax: (++39) 041 2349176 
e-mail: cinzia.dinovi@unive.it 
This Working Paper is published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Opinions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department. The Working Paper series is designed to divulge preliminary or 
incomplete work, circulated to favour discussion and comments. Citation of this paper should consider its provisional character
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2742052 
 
1 
 
Larger is Better: the Scale Effects of the Italian Local Healthcare Authorities 
Amalgamation Program* 
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Abstract 
Consolidation is often considered as a means to lower service delivery costs and enhance 
accountability. This paper uses a prospective evaluation design to derive estimates of the 
potential cost savings that may arise from Local Healthcare Authorities (LHAs) amalgamation 
process, which is concerning the Italian National Health System. We focus specifically on cost 
savings due to scale economies with reference to a particular subset of the production costs of 
the LHAs, i.e. the administrative costs together with the purchasing costs of both goods as well 
as non-healthcare related services. Our results demonstrate the existence of economies of scale 
linked to the size of the LHA population. Hence, the decision to reduce the number of LHAs 
may result in larger local health authorities that are more cost efficient, especially when the 
consolidation process concerns merging a large number of LHA. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, health spending has grown faster than the gross national product in many 
OECD countries. Especially in the years preceding the economic crisis, health spending outpaced 
the rest of the economy, with an annual average growth of 3.8% (OECD Health Statistics, 2015).  
Even though reform efforts have slowed this trend, unless there are major changes in healthcare 
policy, the demands of health spending on public-sector budgets are likely to grow further in 
coming years: indeed, the cost of medical technology and its increasing use and the ageing of the 
population may contribute to the spiraling health care costs. The financial crisis, large 
government deficits and austerity public spending policies have imposed a tight budget constraint 
on the healthcare systems putting great emphasis on the necessity of considering organizational 
restructuring among health providers aimed at controlling or even cutting selected health 
expenditures.  
Analogous to the general OECD trend, also in Italy health expenditure has steadily increased 
over time exceeding the GDP and making its containment a major political issue. In order to 
place stricter control over the public healthcare expenditure, deep reforms started already in the 
90s, bringing Italy to experience a process of decentralization, which has seen a progressive shift 
of jurisdiction in the health domain from center to Regions. The Italian National Health System 
(NHS) has been interested by a reorganization process too characterized by the frequent merging 
of the Local Healthcare Authorities - hereafter LHAs - above all the smaller ones (Ferrè and 
Ricci, 2012). This process has continued in the recent years: the basic idea is that the 
consolidation of existing LHAs into a smaller number of much larger health local authorities may 
lead to minimize administrative overlaps delivering efficiency gains (despite the paucity of 
empirical evidence in support of this contention). 
At an international level, studies that examine the economies of scale deriving from the local 
health department (LHDs) consolidations are not many. In general, they have supported the idea 
that consolidating LHDs may increase efficiency and improve the effectiveness of public health 
services. Hoornbeek et. al (2015), for instance, examined the effects of LHDs consolidations on 
the total and administrative expenditures in Ohio. They found that the consolidation of the 
LHDs might lead to a reduction in total expenditures, but not to a statistically significant change 
in administrative expenses. Santerre (2009) used a nationally representative sample of American 
LHDs to investigate the relation between population size and local public health spending. His 
findings suggested that the minimum efficient scale of a local public health department is 
approximately 100,000 people. Above that size, additional population has little impact on public 
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health spending per capita. Bates and Santerre (2008) contributed to the empirical literature by 
examining the consolidation of a set of district health departments in Connecticut. They found 
that a 1 percent increase in population results in a 1.6 percent decline in public health spending 
per capita. All these analyses are ex-post assessment on what has been the impact of the LHDs 
amalgamation on the health spending. 
With respect to the previous literature on the consolidation of LHDs, we use an ex-ante 
evaluation design to derive estimates of the potential resulting cost savings that may arise from 
LHAs amalgamation. We focus specifically on cost savings due to scale economies with reference 
to a particular subset of the production cost of the LHAs, i.e. the administrative costs together 
with the purchasing costs of both goods as well as non-healthcare related services that, in Italy, 
made up 18.2% of the production costs in 2012 (Italian Ministry of Health, 2012).  
We are not aware of any study about the economic effects of amalgamation in the health 
sectors concerning the Italian NHS. Our research intends to fill this gap in the literature taking 
the advantage of the regional setting of the Italian NHS, which offers a “unique field” for 
exploring the economic effects of the LHAs amalgamation. This type of analysis may be of 
particular interest to policymakers inclined to limit the large and growing cost of healthcare, 
especially at this stage of the radical restructuring effort, where no empirical investigations into 
economies of scale were formally included in the Italian policy agenda to inform the policy 
process.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the second section presents the 
institutional background about the amalgamation process that has concerned Italy in the last 
decades. The third section describes the empirical approach. The fourth section presents the 
results and provides detailed evidence relating to scale efficiencies. The conclusions review the 
methodology and results and provide implications for policy and future research. 
2. The Merger Process 
The Italian NHS is a Beveridge-like health care system, funded through general taxation. It 
was established in 1978 to replace a Bismarckian system of health insurance funds, with the 
declared goal of providing uniform and comprehensive healthcare services across the country 
(France et al. 2005; France and Taroni, 2005; Torbica and Fattore, 2005). Since its inception, the 
NHS has been heavily reformed: as healthcare expenditure increased steadily over time, the 
central government repeatedly introduced policy reforms aimed at controlling such growth. In 
particular, in the last 20 years deep reforms have transformed the centralized structure of the 
Italian NHS through a process of decentralization, with a progressive shift in responsibilities, 
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management and funding from central to regional jurisdictions (Canta et al. 2006). From the 
1990s reforms, which involved a process of decentralization of the NHS, the regional 
governments coordinate and control the LHAs and public and private accredited hospital 
activity. LHAs are distributed throughout the country. Each LHA organizes and plans the health 
care systems for a specific area to provide services in the community closer to where people live. 
The LHAs ensure the “essential levels of care" (Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza, LEA) established 
by national laws. 
The healthcare reforms have also changed the structure of the NHS, entailing a drastic 
reduction during the 90s of the LHAs, which saw the numbers of LHAs decreasing from 659 in 
1992 to 197 in 2001. Then, the territorial reorganization has continued albeit less drastically. 
Indeed, as can be observed in Table 1, the number of LHAs has reduced by 58 units (-29,4%) 
going gradually from 197 in 2001 to 139 in 2015. At the same time, their average size has 
increased by 51%, from 289,000 people in 2001 to approximately 437,000 people in 2015.  Of the 
58 LHAs that were merged between 2001 and 2015 a good 32 of them are indeed located in 
regions under the Recovery Plan.1  
The merging of LHAs seems tightly linked with the central government efforts to contain 
costs, especially through policies aimed at increasing the efficiency of public spending. However, 
even the most virtuous of Regions have merged or are in the process of merging local health 
services. Emilia Romagna is one of these and has just recently merged four LHAs creating one of 
the largest LHA in Italy. Tuscany, too, is moving along these lines, where in 2015 a Bill was 
passed to reform the Regional Health Service by merging twelve LHAs into just three. Veneto is 
about to follow suit where there is a high number of LHAs with a lower average size and 
Lombardy, too, where a recent Regional Health Reform Bill envisages the reduction of fifteen 
LHAs to eight. 
This amalgamation process has seen an organizational model emerge where the size of 
the LHAs has reached a provincial dimension and in some cases, regional. Apart from a few big 
metropolitan cities (Turin, Milan, Rome and Naples), whose territories are subdivided into 
various LHAs, over the rest of the country, the LHAs’ catchment area often coincides with the 
                                            
1 In order to prevent regional health systems’ financial failure in some regions, the central government has 
introduced a special regime, the so-called “Recovery Plan”, in the attempt to place stricter control over regions’ 
healthcare spending (see also de Belvis et al; 2012).  
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provincial one. There is just one notable exception, which is nevertheless about to change, and 
that is in the Veneto area where there are twenty-one LHAs in seven provinces. 
How the LHAs are distributed in demographic terms is anything but uniform. As can be 
seen in the Graph 1, most of the LHAs (90 in number that is 62 % of the total) have a user base 
lower than 400 thousand inhabitants. There is, however, a significant number of LHAs, with a 
user base of 400 to 600 thousand inhabitants (30 in number that is 20.6% of the total). Against 
this, there are five LHAs with fewer than 100 thousand in their user base (three of them in the 
Veneto area) and eleven in Lombardy and Campania with more than one million users. Some 
statistics regarding the dimensions of the LHAs are shown in the Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the potential cost savings which may derive from the 
amalgamation process which is concerning the Italian NHS yet. The choice of concentrating on 
components- i.e. the management costs - as opposed to the total production cost is due to 
particular features of the Italian NHS that on the one hand expects the individual LHAs to keep 
within their budget and on the other makes the LHAs almost totally financially dependent on 
their Regional Governments financial transfers.2 This makes it impossible to estimate economies 
of scale at an aggregate level.3  
 
3.  LHAs amalgamation: the empirical approach 
Savings calculations has been made along the same lines as those of Harrison (2011) as well 
as Rizzi and Zanette (2015). 
The potential total saving ( ijS ) which may derive from a pairwise consolidation of the LHAs 
i and j has been modelled as: 
                                            
2 The Italian NHS organizational structure consists of three levels: central government: regions and autonomous 
provinces and local health authorities. The Central Government is responsible for the national health planning for 
ensuring the “essential levels of care" (Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza, LEA) to their citizens which guarantee equal 
health care coverage throughout the country (Torbica and Fattore, 2005). It provides annually financial transfers to 
the Regions (through the National Health Fund) which are set according to a procedure based on a complex formula 
involving population size, average age, mortality rates and other regional characteristics, among which the historical 
spending levels. The financial transfers are then disbursed by each Region to its LHAs (see Giannoni and Hitiris, 
2002; France et al. 2005; France and Taroni, 2005; Torbica and Fattore, 2005).  
3 Preliminary estimates stressed that the local variability of the per-capita total production cost does not depend 
neither on the LHAs demographic dimension nor on the other socio-economic variables. It arose that the local 
variability of the per-capita production cost tends to be quasi-exclusively explained by the financial transfers 
disbursed by each Region to its LHAs. In particular, we observed that the total production costs exhibit unitary 
elasticity with respect to the Regional transfers because each LHA uses all the received resources. It follows that the 
variability of the per-capita total production cost cannot be used neither to estimate the potential differences in the 
population healthcare needs nor the differences in healthcare demand. 
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 ijjijjiiij POPCPOPCPOPCS −+= , (1) 
 
Equation (1) indicates the difference between the sum of the costs for the merging LHA i and 
LHA j and the cost of LHA ij resulting from the merger event. iC  and jC  are the per-capita 
costs of the pre-merging LHAs, iPOP  and jPOP  indicate their original population, while ijC and 
jiij POPPOPPOP +=  indicate the post-merger per-capita cost and population respectively. Since 
the value of ijC is unknown ex-ante, it is not possible to compute the potential ijS that may be 
obtained from the amalgamation. Hence, we use expected costs rather than actual costs to 
evaluate cost savings: 
 ijjijjiiij POPCPOPCPOPCS ˆˆˆˆ −+=  (2) 
where iCˆ , jCˆ  e ijCˆ  represents the expected per-capita costs. 
For the analysis of the economies of scale, we used the log-linear regression model. In 
order to obtain the expected value of iCˆ , jCˆ  e ijCˆ  included in the equation (2), which refer to 
the administrative costs, the purchasing costs of goods and non-healthcare related services 
alternatively, we estimated three different LHA expenditure functions each of which with the 
following model specification: 
 
 h
1,Dd
hdd
1,Kk
hkk
2
h2h1h εzδlnxγlnpopβlnpopβαlnC +++++= ∑∑
==
 (3) 
The dependent variable lnCh is the natural logarithm of the per-capita costs for the LHA 
h; lnpoph is the logarithm of the district population. Population was set as an explanatory variable 
for exploring whether the LHA size (in terms of number of inhabitants) may affect the healthcare 
per-capita costs for the examined cost type (administrative costs, purchasing costs of goods and 
non-healthcare related services). We used a quadratic function, which complies with the theory of 
economies of scale (U-shaped curve). This approach can capture a range of scale effects, such as 
the one in which costs per-capita fall initially, but then rise after some threshold number of 
inhabitants are served. xhk is a vector of K explanatory variables expressed in logarithm and zhd is a 
vector of D dummy explanatory variables which capture LHAs fixed characteristics. 
kγββ ,, 21 and dδ  are the parameters to be estimated, hε  reflects the error term. 
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Equation (3) has been estimated through an OLS model with robust standard errors and 
by using a step-wise backward elimination (at the 5% level of significance). Essentially, stepwise 
regression assesses all the possible explanatory variables in the dataset and tests which variables 
should be included in the model. We started with all of the predictors in the model and backward 
stepwise regression was used to arrive at a more parsimonious model. The variable that is least 
significant (i.e. the one with the largest p value) is removed and the model is refitted. Each 
subsequent step removes the least significant variable in the model until all remaining variables 
have individual p values 05.0≤ . This follows a ‘general to specific’ method of model building, 
commonly used in econometrics (Maddala, 1992). The variance inflation factor (VIF) index was 
used to test collinearity. Some of the problematic (VIF index >10) predictors were removed. 
Goodness of fit and predictive power were measured with the adjusted R2 index, and Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC). The results of the regression model are included in the Table 2, 
which also contains the eliminated potential predictors.4  
 
3.2 Data and variables 
The data relating to the costs of the LHAs have been gathered from the 2012 annual 
balance sheet drawn up each year by the LHAs and published within the (NSIS) New Health 
Information System by the Ministry of Health. A key characteristic of the NSIS is that it 
standardizes the type and format of health data collected across Italy's regional health systems. In 
order to make the sample more uniform the analysis focused on those 119 LHAs of Regions with 
an Ordinary Statute (ROS).5 
Data concerning the dependent variable have been defined according to the 
disaggregation of the published balance sheet: 
• the “administrative costs” include the cost for “administrative personnel”, with either a 
permanent or a fixed term contract, as well as “other operational costs” including 
                                            
4 As sensitivity analysis, we re-run the model with a less stringent p-value 10.0≤  so as not to arbitrarily exclude 
variables that may be relevant with respect to the hypotheses being tested. This construction did not significantly 
affect the results that remained similar to those presented in the paper. For the sake of brevity, the results of the 
sensitivity analysis are not included but they are available on request. 
 
5 Italy comprises fifteen ordinary statute regions and five special statute regions, which have greater fiscal autonomy 
and legislative powers in all subject matters that are not expressly covered by State legislation. Special statute regions 
(indicated with an asterisk in Table 1) cannot be directly comparable with that of the other regions.  
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allowances, expenses and social security contributions for Governing Bodies and 
Statutory Auditors; 
• “cost of goods” include both the cost of buying health goods (drugs, medical devices, 
dietary products, chemicals etc.) as well as non-health goods (foodstuffs, cleaning 
products, fuel etc); 
• “Non-health services buying costs” include laundry, cleaning, canteen, heating, waste 
disposal, insurance premiums and consultancy fees. 
The first part of Table A.2 in the Appendix includes descriptive statistics of the above 
mentioned costs. The 119 LHAs of the ROS, have an average annual per-capita 
administrative cost of 40.9 euro, goods purchasing cost of 183.2 euro and of non-health 
products of 91.3 euro. The high value of the variation coefficients and the noticeable 
difference between the minimums and the maximums do, however, highlight a significant 
variability between the LHAs’ per-capita costs. These costs total 15.9 billion euro and 
represent 18.2% of the total LHAs production costs. The lower share is the administrative 
costs (2.4%) whilst the purchasing of goods and non-health services total 10.6% and 5.3% 
respectively of the full production cost. 
An important aspect for our purposes is the relationship between the per-capita costs and 
the demographic dimension of the LHAs. Graph 2 shows that the per-capita cost for the 
three areas considered tends to decrease as the LHAs resident population grows. In 
particular, it can be seen how in the larger LHAs (those with a population of over a million) 
the per-capita cost turns out on average to be barely 52.8%, 38.3% and 48.3%, respectively 
for the administration, goods purchasing and non-health services purchasing than that of the 
smaller LHAs (of up to 200,000 inhabitants).  
The definition of the control variables and the related descriptive statistics are included in 
Table A.2 in the Appendix. Since the demographic and socio-economic variables at LHAs 
level are not available in a specific national database, in order to capture these characteristics, 
it was necessary to reconstruct the data in relation to the catchment areas of each LHAs. This 
was made possible by a special table that links Municipalities to LHAs published by the 
Ministry of Health. Once the LHAs catchment area was established, the Municipalities data 
from the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) was used. It was thus possible to identify the 
surface area and the housing density covered by the LHAs, the number of Municipalities, the 
demographic structure indices such as the ageing index, the elderly dependency index, the 
structural dependency index and the quota of foreigners. An analogous procedure was used 
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to reconstruct income per-capita in each of the LHAs starting from the Municipalities data 
on taxable income of each municipality published by the Ministry of Home Affairs.  
Among the control variables, it is the per-capita grant received from the Regional 
Governments, which deserves the most attention. The Central Government distributes the 
National Health Fund to the Region (see footnote 2). For the LHAs the grant received from 
the Regions represents 97.4% of the total production costs of the health service provided to 
resident citizens (Ministry of Health, 2012). The regional grant represents the most important 
exogenous variable that the LHAs managers have to contend with. 
The control variable data on staff and structures that measure health activity have been 
taken from the National Health Service database. Integrated Homecare Patients are part of 
this category as well as a number of LHAs and hospital indicators (eg. medical staff, beds 
available and number of days in hospital). Data was also collected on all the following 
services: Unified Reservation Centers, the Addiction Treatment Service, Departments of 
Preventative Medicine, Mother-Child clinics and Mental Health, Transport to Dialysis 
Centers, Mobile Reanimation Units, and ambulances for the emergency transport of newly 
born babies.  Data on district activity was gathered taking into consideration the number of 
doctors, pediatricians, emergency medical service stations (and of emergency medical service 
hours) and the number of prescriptions. 
The regional differences in the organization of the Health Service and the consequential 
effects on the administration costs have been evaluated using binary variables. The regional 
dummies have been defined bearing in mind that the Regional Health Service can vary 
according to the organizational model adopted (integrated model, semi-integrated, semi-
separate and separate).6 Three different dummies have therefore been defined (one for each 
organizational model apart from the “separate” one which refers to the Lombardy Region). 
Finally, a binary variable was introduced that indicates whether a LHA belongs to a Region 
under a Recovery Plan. 
Input prices have not been considered among the control variables in view of the fact 
that the medical staff salaries (the main production cost component) and many other input 
unit prices are uniformly set by law nationwide.  
 
                                            
6 According to Mapelli (2007), four models characterize the way different regions have organized the governance 
structures of their health care enterprises. The classification reported here uses one of the more significant 
parameters: the direct management of hospital beds (for further details see also Brenna, 2011). 
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4. Results 
 
Econometric analysis highlights economies of scale linked to the size of the LHA population. 
Indeed, Table 2 shows that the costs per capita considered in this analysis tend to decrease as the 
demographic size of the LHA grows. The elasticity of the administrative cost per capita as far as 
the resident population is concerned is -0.2525 whilst the square of the logarithm of the 
population concerning the goods and non–health service buying is -0.006 and -0.0086 
respectively. All things being equal, this indicated that the demographic growth of the LHA 
brings with it a reduction in costs, hence a satisfactory LHA merging policy brings about savings. 
This result is backed by the downward trend regarding the population by the three functions 
shown on Graph 3 displaying how, for the three activities considered, coeteris paribus, the costs per 
capita are much higher for the smaller LHA than for the larger ones (see also Santerre, 2009). 
In order to evaluate the potential effects of merging, two different policies have been 
simulated: the first assumes that only smaller LHA are merged and in particular those that are 
within the first distribution quartile as far as resident population is concerned. This first 
simulation involved 31 LHA with fewer than 214,726 inhabitants and a further 17 bordering 
LHA which led to the creation of 23 new LHA with an average population size of 473.586.  As a 
result the number of LHAs decreased by 25 units.  
The second policy, which is more general than the one before, envisages a full territorial 
reorganization of the NHS. It assumes that the number and territorial competence of the LHA 
align with those of the new provinces according to the Decree Law 5 November 2012 n.188, 
where the system is organized into 51 provinces.7 Under this hypothesis 105 of the 119 RSOs’ 
LHA would have different territories from those envisaged and would be grouped into 35 new 
LHA with an average population of 1,157,242. In this case the number of LHAs decreased by 70 
units.  
Once the new LHA territories have been defined, for each of the LHA the expected cost per 
capita has been estimated for each of the three activities according to the expenditure functions 
previously estimated. The expected savings for each single aggregation and for the whole merging 
policy have then been calculated based on the equation (2). The simulation results for these two 
scenarios are given in Tables 3 and 4. 
                                            
7 The Law Decree n. 188 of 5 November 2012 was meant to reduce the Italian provinces from 89 to 51.  
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As far as the first policy is concerned (Table 3) the savings are expected to amount to 522 
million euro, most of which coming from savings in the buying of goods (258 million euro). Such 
a policy would allow a 2.54% average reduction in the total LHA production cost. In some cases, 
however, such as those regarding the LHA merging in Tuscany, the economic advantage would 
be 5.42%. 
On the other hand, the savings from the second merging policy would be far more 
substantial (Table 4). Due to the fact that in this scenario almost all LHA would be merged, the 
savings would amount to 2.2 billion euro. In addition, as far as total production costs are 
concerned the savings would be more substantial, on average 3.07%, due to the fact that the 
average size of the new LHA would be considerably bigger than that of the first scenario. On 
average, this policy would allow each LHA to save on average 63 million euro, most of which 
coming from savings on goods purchasing (32.1 million euro). 
The results obtained also indicate that not all merging is beneficial to the same extent. The 
greatest savings can be found in those that envisage merging a larger number of LHA, such as the 
new LHAs in Veneto and Tuscany. Here the savings could exceed 4% of the total health service 
production cost. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Many mergers and reconfigurations of Italian LHAs have taken place in recent years with 
important changes in the structure of the NHS. Insofar as we have been able to ascertain, the 
potential presence of economies of scale due to LHAs merging process in Italy has not 
empirically investigated before. In our paper, we performed a cross sectional study using a 
prospective evaluation design to derive estimates of the potential resulting cost savings that may 
arise from LHAs amalgamation. Our results demonstrate the existence of economies of scale 
(especially with regard to management costs) linked to the size of the LHA population. Hence, 
the decision to reduce the number of LHAs may result in bigger local health authorities that are 
more cost efficient especially when the consolidation process involves a larger number of LHA. 
The research findings of this paper provide a practical insight into the concerns and challenges of 
local health authorities’ amalgamations and may have important implications for the NHS 
organizations and for the containment of the public health care expenditure.  
Even though the Italian health care sector now accounts for over 8.8% of GDP (the 
other advanced countries with modern health care systems spend 9 % or more) Italy has 
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experienced substantial health care spending growth which has exceeded economic growth in the 
last decades (France et al. 2005; de Belvis et al; 2012). The aging of the population and the 
development of potentially valuable and expensive innovations are likely to put continuing 
upward pressure on health spending.  Italy's so-called “spending review” process confirmed that 
the government goal is still €10 billion (0.6 points of GDP) in savings in the Stability Law.  
Health care sector is expected to contribute to the public spending rationalization effort too also 
through the reorganization of the territorial health care system. The economies of scale that seem 
to derive from LHAs amalgamation may be an important driver in  limiting the large and growing 
cost of healthcare and may be used to improve the quality of health care, for instance, in terms of 
making more resources available for R&D maintaining the level of service also in terms of quality 
and distribution (Kristensen et al.2012).  
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Table 1 – The amalgamation process of the Local Healthcare Agencies 
(Number of LHAs for each Region. Underlined the year of the consolidation) 
Region 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
                
Piedmont 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Valle d'Aosta* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lombardy 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
P. A. Bolzano* 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P. A. Trento* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Veneto 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Friuli V. Giulia* 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 
Liguria 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Emilia Romagna 13 13 13 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 8 8 
Tuscany 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Umbria 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 
Marche 13 13 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lazio 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Abruzzo 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Molise 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Campania 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Apuglia 12 12 12 12 12 12 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Basilicata 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Calabria 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 
Sicily* 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Sardinia* 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Total 197 197 197 195 195 180 171 157 148 146 145 145 143 140 139 
                                
*: Special Statute Regions and Autonomous Provinces. 
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from the Ministry of Health 
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Table 2 – The estimated expenditure functions 
(OLS with robust standard errors and step-wise backward elimination) 
 
Control variables 
Administrative costs Cost of goods Non-health service costs 
 Coeff. t P>|t| Coeff. t P>|t
| 
Coeff. t P>|t
| 
 costant 2.23887 1.38 0.170 -8.99622 -2.89 0.005 -24.77602 -7.65 0.000 
log Pop -0.25256 -8.01 0.000   #   # 
log Pop 2   # -0.00603 -2.86 0.005 -0.00869 -3.95 0.000 
log Grants 0.51765 2.92 0.004 2.09343 4.95 0.000 2.78445 7.32 0.000 
log S-healthservice -0.41799 -6.72 0.000 -0.90131 -7.14 0.000 -0.94619 -6.62 0.000 
log S-otherservices 0.04654 2.20 0.030 0.07364 2.47 0.015 0.14692 4.41 0.000 
log Income   #   # 0.76341 2.99 0.003 
dummy d_central_h -0.10665 -2.88 0.005   # 0.60708 5.78 0.000 
log Hospital beds -0.04593 -4.04 0.000   #   # 
log Doctors -0.58275 -2.61 0.010   #   # 
log Addiction services   # -0.16335 -2.57 0.011 -0.20820 -3.30 0.001 
log Dependency   # -1.18859 -2.15 0.034 -2.39917 -3.24 0.002 
dummy d_qintegrated   # 0.46091 6.09 0.000 0.63795 5.36 0.000 
dummy d_qseparate   # 0.31487 2.49 0.014 0.69532 5.90 0.000 
dummy d_recovery   # 0.32366 2.78 0.006   # 
dummy d_central   # -0.29502 -3.72 0.000   # 
log Foreigners   # 0.15816 2.27 0.025   # 
log Prescriptions   # -0.93553 -3.27 0.001   # 
log Emergency hours   # -0.03658 -2.48 0.015   # 
Numb. obs. 119   119   119   
F F(7,111) 75.8  F(13,105) 39.97  F(10,108) 56.87  
Prob > F 0.00000   0.00000   0.00000   
R-squared 0.77440   0.81550   0.86010   
Root MSE 0.18514   0.30659   0.32825   
Akaike's information criterion 
(AIC) 
-55.990   69.436   83.039   
#: Variabiles removed from regression since not significative at the 5% level.  
The following variabiles have also been removed from all regressions since not significative at the 5% level: density; 
municipalities; hotel beds; pediatricians; facilities; homecare, (all in terms of log), and d_reservation; d_maternal; d_transport; 
d_reanimation; d_ambulances (as dummies). See Table A.2 for descriptions.  
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Graph 1 - Distribution of the LHAs by dimensional class (year 2012) 
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Graph 2 – Per capita costs for LHA dimensional class  
(Mean for each class – population expressed in thousands) 
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Graph 3 – Demographic dimension and per-capita costs 
(The values of the others control variables are set to the mean values) 
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Table 3 – The effects of a minimal amalgamation program 
Regions 
Number of 
ASL Expected savings (x1.000) 
Before 
merge 
After 
merge 
in the 
administr. 
costs 
in the cost 
of goods 
in the non-
health 
service 
costs 
Total 
Expected 
savings 
as % on 
total 
production 
cost 
 
  
     Basilicata 2 1 3,170 6,149 3,019 12,338 1.21% 
Calabria 5 3 7,824 23,389 9,930 41,142 2.49% 
Emilia Romagna 11 9 7,055 22,570 18,578 48,203 2.40% 
Lazio 12 11 3,824 11,455 13,016 28,295 3.10% 
Liguria 5 3 7,872 25,639 16,295 49,806 3.03% 
Lombardy 15 14 394 4,106 2,533 7,033 1.51% 
Piedmont 13 9 15,667 52,662 26,102 94,431 2.37% 
Tuscany 12 10 7,045 32,686 24,131 63,862 5.42% 
Umbria 4 2 6,457 26,134 25,492 58,083 3.51% 
Veneto 21 13 21,086 53,335 44,366 118,787 1.97% 
Total 100 75 80,394 258,125 183,461 521,981 2.54% 
Total actual costs   519,779 2,248,915 1,134,226 3,902,920 
 % of savings   15.5% 11.5% 16.2% 13.4% 
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Table 4 – The effects of a general amalgamation program 
Regions 
Number of 
ASL 
Expected savings (x1.000) 
Before 
merge 
After 
merge 
in the 
administr. 
costs 
in the cost 
of goods 
in the non-
health service 
costs 
Total 
Expected 
savings 
as % on 
total 
production 
cost 
 
  
     Abruzzo 4 2 10,002 45,550 36,867 92,420 3.47% 
Basilicata 2 1 3,170 6,149 3,019 12,338 1.21% 
Calabria 5 3 8,259 23,957 10,492 42,708 4.40% 
Campania 7 4 20,613 59,488 44,816 124,917 2.45% 
Emilia Romagna 11 5 31,804 103,005 73,984 208,794 2.60% 
Lazio 12 3 62,131 203,342 166,844 432,316 3.85% 
Liguria 5 3 8,977 30,831 17,388 57,195 2.45% 
Lombardy 15 7 18,181 47,696 22,102 87,979 0.76% 
Piedmont 13 5 45,092 176,183 79,002 300,277 3.52% 
Apulia 6 4 11,439 55,172 36,888 103,498 3.03% 
Tuscany 12 4 40,282 157,492 89,040 286,814 4.72% 
Umbria 4 1 11,091 39,586 38,753 89,431 5.40% 
Veneto 21 5 60,715 177,144 131,869 369,727 3.95% 
Total 117 47 331,756 1,125,595 751,063 2,208,414 3.07% 
Total actual costs   1,488,399 6,505,317 3,281,217 11,274,933 
 % of savings   22.3% 17.3% 22.9% 19.6% 
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Appendix I 
Table A.1 – The dimension of Local Healthcare Agencies 
(Number of LHAs per region and descriptive statistics about their population and area – year 2012) 
Regions n. 
LHAs 
Population at 1/1/2012  Surface area (in ha.) 
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
        Piedmont 13 335,205 577,407 169,172 195,285 578,498 5,738 
Valle d'Aosta* 1 126,620 126,620 126,620 326,090 326,090 326,090 
Lombardy 15 646,725 1,497,762 101,148 159,091 346,418 22,544 
P. A. Bolzano* 1 504,708 504,708 504,708 739,838 739,838 739,838 
P. A. Trento* 1 524,877 524,877 524,877 620,712 620,712 620,712 
Veneto 21 231,127 481,077 67,661 87,654 274,326 39,347 
Friuli V. Giulia* 6 202,963 351,153 72,425 131,038 236,635 21,251 
Liguria 5 313,468 711,426 145,835 108,324 154,629 66,654 
Emilia Romagna 11 394,658 846,046 130,007 204,116 344,748 78,728 
Tuscany 12 305,648 802,084 164,423 191,559 450,312 35,624 
Umbria 4 220,804 365,754 132,840 211,608 249,615 180,805 
Marche 1 1,540,688 1,540,688 1,540,688 940,138 940,138 940,138 
Lazio 12 458,335 667,594 154,909 143,602 361,524 22,830 
Abruzzo 4 326,604 387,761 298,087 270,796 504,755 123,033 
Molise 1 313,145 313,145 313,145 446,065 446,065 446,065 
Campania 7 823,489 1,092,574 284,560 195,299 495,416 13,416 
Apulia 6 675,012 1,246,742 391,770 325,682 700,754 154,295 
Basilicata 2 288,781 377,512 200,050 503,666 659,444 347,889 
Calabria 5 391,684 713,869 163,216 304,438 670,975 115,064 
Sicily* 9 555,539 1,248,660 176,717 287,027 503,450 162,389 
Sardinia* 8 204,731 549,893 57,349 301,250 457,041 149,971 
Total 145 409,615 1,540,688 57,349 208,326 940,138 5,738 
    
      
*: Special Statute Regions and Autonomous Provinces. 
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Table A.2 – Descriptive statistics 
(Concerning the LHAs of Ordinary Statute Regions) 
Name   Description Source Mean Std. Dev. 
      Dependent  var iab le s     
Total costs 
 
 Total production costs minus depreciations and revenues 
for services to non residents - Euro per-capita A 
1,653.3
2 220.40 
Administrative 
costs  
Costs for administrative personnel, with either a 
permanent or a fixed term contract, other operational 
costs, including allowances, expenses and social security 
contributions for Governing Bodies and Statutory 
Auditors Administrative costs - Euro per-capita 
A 40.92 13.86 
Cost of goods 
  
Cost of buying health goods (drugs, medical devices, 
dietary products, chemicals etc.) as well as non-health 
goods (foodstuffs, cleaning products, fuel etc). - Euro per-
capita 
A 183.21 97.96 
Non-health 
services costs  
Total buying costs for non-health services such as laundry, 
cleaning, canteen, heating, waste disposal, insurance 
premiums and consultancy fees - Euro per-capita 
A 91.35 47.73 
      
Contro l  var iab le s  
   
Pop 
 Resident population in the LHA on January 1°, 2012 B  423,382.5 295,260.8 
Dependency 
 Structural dependency ratio of the population 
(pop≥65+pop≤14)/pop15-64 B  0.545 0.040 
Foreigners  Percentage share of foreign citizens B  0.075 0.032 
Density  Demographic density (Pop/Surface area) B  586.5 1,280.2 
Grants  Grants received from Regional Governments as part of the National Health Found - Euro per-capita A 1,610.3 184.7 
Municipalities  Number of municipalities in the LHA (2012) B  56.345 51.238 
Income 
 Tax base of personal income tax (IRPEF), 2011 - Euro 
per-capita C  
12,476.
6 2,834.8 
Hotel beds  Beds in hotels (2012) /Pop B 0.040 0.056 
S-healthservices  Share of health services costs on total costs minus depreciations. A 0.180 0.074 
S-otherservices 
 Share of costs for consultancies, partnerships, temporary 
work and other labor costs in non-health area on total 
costs minus depreciations. 
A 
0.001 0.002 
Hospital beds * Number of beds programmed in hospitals / Pop D 615.7 440.5 
Doctors  Number of doctors * 1,000 / Pop D 0.764 0.077 
Pediatricians  Number of pediatricians * 1,000 / Pop D 0.123 0.020 
Facilities  Doctor’s officies and laboratories * 100,000 / Pop D 13.906 7.992 
Addiction services  Number of Addiction Treatment Services * 100,000/Pop D 1.169 0.655 
Emergency hours  Emergency medical service hours / Pop D 0.327 0.238 
Prescriptions  Number of prescriptions / Pop D 9.907 1.392 Homecare  Integrated homecare assistance * 1,000 / Pop D 11.853 8.315 d_reservation  Unified reservation center – Type 2 (Dummy) D 0.269 0.445 
d_maternal  Maternal and child department (Dummy) D 0.866 0.343 
d_transport  Transport service to dialysis center (Dummy) D 0.689 0.465 
d_reanimation  Mobile Reanimation Units (Dummy) D 0.269 0.445 
d_ambulances  
Ambulances for emergency transportation of newly born 
babies (Dummy) D 0.084 0.279 
d_integrated  Dummy for LHA in regions with an integrated organizational model (n=37) E 0.218 0.415 
d_qintegrated 
 Dummy for LHA in regions with a semi-integrated 
organizational model (n=59) E 0.496 0.502 
d_qseparate  Dummy for LHA in regions with a semi-separate organizational model (n=34) E 0.160 0.368 
d_recovery  Dummy for LHA in regions under Recovery Plan (n=57) E 0.403 0.493 
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d_central 
 Dummy for LHA in regions with Centralised Purchasing 
System E 0.471 0.501 
d_central_h 
 Dummy for LHA in regions with Centralised Purchasing 
System only for the Health Sistem E 0.353 0.480 
* : Only hospitals directly managed by LHA and assimilated. 
A : Ministry of Health (2012a). 
B : Authors’ elaboration on municipal data from ISTAT (2012a), ISTAT (2012b) and ISTAT (2012c). 
C : Authors’ elaboration on municipal data from MEF (2012). 
D : Ministry of Health (2012b). 
E : Authors’ elaboration.       
 
